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ABSTRACT 
At an estimated 205 million gallons, the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) is the largest oil spill in the history of the United States.  
During nearly three months of active discharge, oil reached the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, resulting in 
large scale fishery closures.  Many recreational anglers who planned visits to the Gulf Coast likely canceled, rescheduled, or 
changed their trip location to areas not affected.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 allows resource trustees to claim and recover losses 
on behalf of the public.  Recoverable damages include the cost of primary restoration and interim losses that encompass passive and 
direct use values, such as recreation.  Trustees must use funds recovered for restoration activities.  In this paper, we use a series of 
random utility models of site choice by recreational anglers in the Southeast U.S. to estimate monetary compensation measures for 
losses by anglers due to the DWH spill.  The models allow us to estimate different compensation measures for anglers who fish from 
shore, private boats, and those who fish from charter and party boats. Our most conservative estimates indicate that the total 
monetary compensation due to anglers is in the range of 540 million dollars. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the largest oil spill in the history of the United States occurred off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of 
Mexico. After an explosion on April 20 in the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), a drilling platform operated by British Petrole-
um, crude oil gushed from the sea floor at a depth of approximately one mile until July 15 when the well was successfully 
capped. During this time, an estimated 205 million gallons of oil were released into Gulf waters. For comparison, the Exxon
-Valdez spill resulted in an estimated 11 million gallons of crude being discharged into Prince William Sound, Alaska. As a 
result of the DWH spill, large areas of Federal and State waters were closed to fishing throughout the Gulf. At the spill’s 
height, 37% of Federal waters were under a fishery closure. State imposed closures varied between 95% of State waters 
closed in Mississippi, 55% in Louisiana, 40% in Alabama, and nearly 2% in Florida (Upton 2011).  
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 stipulates the kinds of compensable losses and damages from oil spills in the 
United States. These compensable damages include ‘market’ losses such as damages to private property, as well as losses of 
profits and wages from decreased economic activity as a result of spills. In the case of market losses, the affected party can 
seek compensation from responsible parties directly through the courts. But the OPA also establishes ‘non-market’ losses, 
such as damages to biological and ecological resources as well as lost recreational opportunities, to be subject to compensa-
tion by responsible parties. In such cases, State, Federal, or Tribal Authorities acting as resource trustees for the public can 
seek compensation from responsible parties through the legal system (Jones 1997, Jones and Pease 1997). 
A combination of fishery closures and media coverage of the spill is likely to have contributed to lower participation in 
coastal and marine based recreation throughout the Gulf States. In the jargon of economics, we could have expected a 
decrease in the demand for recreational activities in the Gulf of Mexico as a result of the DWH spill. The purpose of this 
research is to determine the magnitude of this decrease in demand for marine recreational fishing in the Southeastern United 
States and to estimate the monetary compensation due to the fishing public as a result of the DWH spill. This document 
summarizes our methods and preliminary results.   
  
METHODS AND DATA  
 The basic insight behind the valuation of recreational activities and the resources upon which nature-based 
recreation depends is the use of travel costs to the recreational location as a proxy of the price paid to engage in such 
activities (Bockstael et al. 1991). The earliest recreation-based valuation applications consisted on estimating a demand 
curve for recreation at a single site throughout a season. Such methods yield a demand curve similar to that for market 
goods, with the notable exception that instead of price and quantity consumed, the demand curve is estimated based on 
travel costs to the site and the total number of trips taken over a season. Estimation of such a demand function allows the 
computation of measures of consumer surplus, which are the relevant measures of economic benefits for Benefit Cost 
Analysis (BCA) and policy relevant decision-making. 
The single-site travel cost method, however, does not deal with substitute sites and is not suitable for valuing changes 
in quality that affect multiple sites simultaneously. In the case of a localized oil spill that affects a single bay or beach, for 
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instance, we could use a single site travel cost model to 
estimate the loss caused by the spill. If the spill affects a 
large area and many recreational locations suffer as a 
consequence, a different valuation method is required. One 
of such methods, known as the Random Utility Model 
(RUM), takes each recreational location as a discrete 
alternative and models the choice that each individual 
makes from the set of available alternatives. Individuals are 
seen as choosing the location that yields the maximum 
utility, and this choice is related to the attributes of the 
chosen location and the available alternatives.  
Key among these attributes is the cost of travel to each 
available location, which must account for the monetary 
costs of travel and the opportunity costs of time or the 
income foregone by choosing to recreate. Estimating a 
choice model with travel costs as an attribute allows us to 
estimate monetary values for changes in the other attributes 
in the model, as well as the value of site closures or new 
sites (e.g., Bockstael et al. 1987, Kaoru 1995, Thomas et al. 
2010). In practice, the valuation exercise consists of 
developing a series of counterfactual scenarios in which 
recreationists can pay to obtain improvements in different 
attributes (Haab and McConnell 2002), hence the measure 
is referred to as willingness-to-pay. Computation of 
willingness-to-pay is possible once the parameters of the 
RUM are estimated. 
To estimate a RUM of marine recreational fishing in 
the Southeastern United States we use creel survey data 
from the Marine Recreational Information Program 
(MRIP). The MRIP intercept survey reports the county of 
origin and destination of a large sample of recreational 
fishing trips, as well as the level and composition of catch 
(Hicks et al. 2000). MRIP intercepts are reported in two-
month fishing locations, and use this distance to create 
measures intervals known as waves. We complement this 
dataset by calculating the distances traveled between the 
county of origin and the available of the costs incurred in 
travel. We also use the median income in the angler’s 
county of residence to compute approximate measures of 
the opportunity costs of time. Further, we use the fishing 
closure maps created by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) during the DWH spill to 
create a binary index of oil spill impacts for each location 
during each wave. For each angler intercepted by MRIP in 
2009 and 2010, therefore, we have information on the costs 
of travel to each available location and whether or not each 
location was affected by oil at the time the fishing trip took 
place. In addition, we use historic MRIP intercepts from 
2006 to 2008 to compute indices of historic catch per unit 
effort in each location. 
To create a catch-based attribute that varies across 
individuals and locations, we develop a count-data model 
of catch (McConnell et al. 1995). Using this model we 
attempt to predict the number of fish each angler would 
have caught in each of the available locations. As predic-
tors, we use the historic catch in each location during the 
season in which the trip takes place, the angler’s participa-
tion in the last year, and the fishing mode used by the 
angler, among others. This predicted catch measure gives 
us an attribute that captures the heterogeneity that exists 




We estimate separate models for anglers in three 
distinct fishing modes. The shore-based fishing models 
include anglers fishing from natural or man-made struc-
tures such as beaches, jetties, docks, and piers. The for-hire 
fishing models include anglers fishing in guided trips from 
charter, party or head boats. The private boat models 
include all anglers who use their own boats or who rent 
vessels for fishing, and includes motorboats as well as non-
motorized vessels such as canoes or kayaks. 
There exists a substantial literature on the selection of 
discrete alternatives for recreational RUM models (e.g., 
Parsons and Kealy 1992, Parsons and Needleman 1992, 
Feather 1994, Lupi and Feather 1998). Ideally, each 
alternative would represent an elemental site, or the actual 
location where recreation takes place. In the case of 
recreational fishing, one could think of fishing ‘spots’, or at 
least individual access points, as the elemental sites. When 
the area under study is large and contains many access 
points and fishing spots, however, modelers can run into 
computational limitations that would preclude the estima-
tion of a RUM. In the case of recreational fishing in the 
Southeastern United States, for instance, the number of 
access points from Louisiana to North Carolina may run in 
the hundreds of thousands, and the number of fishing spots 
may well run in the millions. To deal with this problem, 
modelers can use a random sample of alternatives — rather 
than the entire set — or can aggregate elemental sites into 
larger discrete locations, or a combination of both. 
In our case, the attribute of interest is the impact of the 
DWH spill. As the largest spill in U.S. history, this spill 
affected a large number of elemental sites simultaneously.  
Furthermore, all locations within the same county, and in 
many cases within the same state, were more or less 
equally affected by oil at the same time. We therefore 
aggregate elemental sites into ten distinct regions. The 
states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South 
Carolina, and North Carolina are all treated as individual 
regions. The state of Florida is divided into four sub-
regions which can be expected to have suffered differential 
oil spill impacts: Northwest Florida, Southwest Florida, the 
Florida Keys, and the Florida Atlantic Coast. 
A decision tree that establishes a sequence in which 
choices are made is implicit in the creation of the discrete 
alternatives in the RUM. In our case we allow substitution 
not only between the ten aggregated regions, but also 
across six time periods in each year. For the definition of 
time periods we use MRIP’s system of fishing waves.  
Therefore, we assume that anglers who fish in the South-
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eastern U.S. can choose to fish during one of six seasons, 
in one of ten regions. Each angler thus has a total of 60 
distinct alternatives from which to choose, and the 
observed choice is assumed to be that which maximizes 
each angler’s utility. 
We include seven trip attributes in our RUMs of 
fishing choice. Travel cost, which includes both travel-
related expenses and the opportunity costs of time, is 
perhaps the most important attribute as it allows the 
monetary valuation of the other attributes. Our main 
attribute of interest, the indicator of impacts from the DWH 
spill, is also included in the models that use data from 
2010, the year in which the oil spill took place. We also 
include indicators for the season in which the fishing trip 
takes place by using indicators for the spring, summer and 
fall months. We control for site popularity by using the 
number of interviews conducted in each region, as well as 
for the size of each region in terms of the number of access 
points or elemental sites contained in each. We also use an 
indicator for whether the fishing region is located in the 
Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic Coast to control for 
geographic preferences. Finally, we use our expectation of 
the catch that each angler would have enjoyed in each 
fishing region during each wave as a trip attribute. 
Two different procedures are used to estimate our 
RUMs. \ First, we use the conditional logit (McFadden 
1974), which is the earliest of all methods consistent with 
the random utility concept and suffers from a wide range of 
shortcomings, in particular the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) assumption. The second procedure used 
is the state-of-the-art mixed or random parameters logit 
(Train 2003), which uses simulated maximum-likelihood to 
estimate not only the parameters themselves but also their 
distributions. The use of simulation methods makes IIA not 
be problem, and the mixed logit is considered one of the 




As expected, the willingness-to-pay measures obtained 
are positive, indicating that anglers were negatively 
affected by the DWH spill and that there exists a positive 
and finite monetary amount that could make anglers whole.  
The measures we estimate are the willingness-to-pay for oil 
spill prevention of the average angler in each of the three 
fishing modes for each fishing trip. That is, our measures 
are the amount due to anglers for each fishing trip as 
compensation for the DWH oil spill. The compensation 
estimates obtained vary across estimation procedures, with 
those obtained from the mixed logit being more conserva-
tive than those obtained from the conditional logit. 
The conditional logit estimates of per trip monetary 
compensation range from a mean of $125.63 due to anglers 
in the for-hire sector to a mean of $9.95 due to anglers 
fishing from private boats. The mean per trip compensation 
due to anglers fishing from shore is $65.57 (Figure 1). The 
distribution of willingness-to-pay is relatively wide in the 
for-hire sector, but less so in the shore and private boat 
fishing modes. Using estimates of total fishing effort in the 
ten regions under study obtained from MRIP statistics 
(Table 1), the total damages to anglers fishing from shore, 
for-hire, and private boats are $1.2 billion, $119 million 
and $221 million, respectively, for a total compensable loss 
of $1.452 billion U.S. dollars (Table 2). 
Figure 1. Conditional Logit estimates of monetary  
compensation by fishing mode. 
Table 1. Estimated Marine Recreational Fishing  
Participation in the Southeastern United States,  
excluding Texas (Fishing Trips in 2010). 
Mode Trips 
Shore 16,967,139 
For Hire 948,044 
Private 22,198,529 
TOTAL 40,113,712 
Source: Marine Recreational Information Program  
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The estimates of per trip compensation due to anglers 
from the mixed logit range from a mean of $34.53 for 
anglers who hire fishing guides to a mean of $1.64 for 
anglers who use private boats for fishing. Anglers fishing 
from shore are due a mean compensation of $27.76 per trip 
according to the mixed logit (Figure 2). As in the condi-
tional logit results, the distribution of willingness-to-pay is 
widest in the for-hire sector and narrowest in the private 
boat fishing mode, while that of shore-based anglers is 
somewhere in between. Multiplying the mean willingness 
to pay for oil spill prevention figures by the estimated 
number of recreational fishing trips in the Southeast yields 
compensable losses of $471 million, $32.7 million and 
$36.4 million U.S. dollars for anglers in the shore, for-hire, 
and private boat fishing modes, respectively. The total 
compensable loss according to the mixed logit estimates 
has a 95 percent confidence interval ranging between $442 
and $661 million and a mean of $540 million. 
DISCUSSION 
An important point that must be made at the outset is 
that the estimates of compensable losses reported here are 
based on ‘revealed preferences’. That is, these estimates 
are based on actual consumer behavior — Southeast 
marine anglers in this case — rather than on ‘stated 
preferences’ surveys that ask anglers about their willing-
ness-to-pay for oil spill prevention directly. Our methods 
determine the relative importance of different trip attrib-
utes, most importantly travel costs and impacts from the 
DWH spill, on the probability of choosing particular times 
and locations to go fishing. These indices of relative 
importance of attributes on choices, which we estimate as 
model parameters, are then used to compute monetary 
measures of loss based on counterfactual scenarios in 
which the relative importance of attributes remains the 
same. The counterfactual scenarios use simple algebra to 
posit the question: If the DWH spill could have been 
prevented, would anglers be willing to pay more to go 
fishing? 
As such, these estimates are not measures of economic 
impact and do not measure the impacts of the DWH spill 
on the economy of the Southeastern states and their coastal 
communities. Also, while these measures are related to 
market expenses, they are not measures of lost expendi-
tures on fishing trips and fishing equipment as a result of 
the DWH spill. Rather, they are a measure of the loss in 
well being experienced by Southeast anglers as a result of 
the spill. To illustrate this loss, consider an individual 
whose preferred activity on a given day is fishing in her 
favorite spot in the Mississippi coast. On average, she 
spends a given amount of money in trips to that spot, and 
since that is her preferred activity there is nothing else she 
would rather do with her time and money than fishing in 
that particular spot.  On this particular day though, there is 
a large amount of oil in her favorite spot. The oil makes the 
fishing trip undesirable and possibly a health concern. As a 
result, she decides to stay home and watch TV instead of 
going fishing. Even though she now has more money than 
if she had gone fishing, she is likely upset at not being able 
to go fishing as she would have liked to do. This negative 
feeling from not being able to fish is what we are attempt-
ing to quantify in this research. 
A result that may seem surprising is the large magni-
tude of the loss experienced by shore-based anglers 
compared to that suffered by those who fish from private 
Table 2. Total Loss Estimates (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  Conditional Logit   Mixed Logit 
  Mean 95% CI   Mean 95% CI 
Shore $1,112.50 $983.90 $1,239.50   $471.00 $399.20 $545.30 
For Hire $119.10 $99.10 $138.60   $32.70 $22.90 $42.60 
Private $220.90 $142.10 $299.00   $36.40 $0.20 $73.40 
TOTAL $1,452.50 $1,225.10 $1,677.10   $540.10 $422.30 $661.30 
Figure 2. Mixed Logit estimates of monetary compensation 
by fishing mode.  
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boats. A priori, one could expect that since those who fish 
from private boats probably spend more money on fishing 
trips and on fishing related equipment, their loss would 
have been larger. However, the magnitude of the compen-
sation measure is directly related to anglers’ response to 
the oil spill and inversely related to their response to travel 
costs. That is, if anglers are highly averse to traveling long 
distances their compensation measures for oil spill effects 
tend to be small. Conversely, if anglers are highly averse to 
visiting locations impacted by oil their compensation 
measures tend to be large. Through our behavioral models 
we find that anglers who fish from private boats are very 
responsive to travel costs and are the most averse to 
traveling long distances to go fishing, as can be expected 
since their travel costs are likely to be larger than those for 
anglers in other modes who do not have to pull trailers 
with heavy boats. Anglers who use private boats are also 
the least responsive to oil spill impacts and were the least 
likely to cancel or substitute trips due to the DWH spill.  
Both of these results are reflected on the relatively small 
estimates of per trip willingness-to-pay for prevention of 
the spill for private boat anglers. 
On the other hand, anglers fishing from shore and 
using the for-hire sector are less responsive to travel costs 
and are willing to travel longer distances to go fishing.  
Similarly, anglers in both of these fishing modes were 
more responsive to the impacts of the DWH spill, and were 
more likely to cancel or substitute trips away from regions 
that were affected by oil. This explains the high per trip 
estimates of willingness-to-pay for prevention of the DWH 
spill in the shore and for-hire fishing modes relative to 
private boats. 
Our most conservative estimates suggest that individu-
als who fish in saltwater in the Southeastern United States 
are owed close to $540 million dollars as a result of the 
DWH oil spill. The Federal and State governments, acting 
on behalf of the angler citizenry could attempt to recover 
these damages from responsible parties, as stipulated in the 
OPA of 1990. If they did, recovered funds would have to 
be used in restoration activities (Jones and Pease 1997).  
For the sake of fairness, it would seem that restoration 
activities should compensate anglers according to their 
loss. The results reported here could be used to determine 
the size of the pie to be used for restoration, as well as the 
portion of the pie that should be directed to improving 
fishing for each of the different modes. 
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